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Date 24 JAN 91 HRP 89-2

## Watchdog Committee Proposed

WASHINGTON POST, 29 June 1955

# Hoover Task Force Urges Revision Of U. S. Intelligence Operations

By Warren Unna  
Staff Reporter

The Hoover Commission declared yesterday that diplomatic niceties and traditional conservatism within the State Department have prevented the United States from doing a thorough job of collecting foreign intelligence.

At the same time, it recommended establishment of a "watchdog" committee to check operations and expenses of this Nation's nine major intelligence agencies.

Significantly, the Commission found the United States

intelligence community is led by "sincere and dedicated" men and that recruiting into the top-secret intelligence agencies is "reassuring."

The Commission's task force, headed by Gen. Mark W. Clark, reported it had found "no valid ground for the suspicion" voiced last year by Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) that the Central Intelligence Agency was infested with security risks.

The Hoover Commission comments appear in a 67-page report to be submitted to Congress today. The report confines itself to intelligence administration and coordination.

A longer report on national security also was prepared by the Clark task force. It was considered so top secret that Commission Chairman Herbert Hoover and his 11 fellow commissioners passed it on to President Eisenhower unopened.

Aiming its severest criticism at the State Department, the task force declared: "Among some of those responsible for implementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotiation there seems to exist an abhorrence to anything that might lead to diplomatic, or See HOOVER, Page 4, Col. 1

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# Changes Urged In Intelligence

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even protocol, complications." It found "this negative atti-

tude" kept "potentially available" military intelligence on Communist nations from being used.

"Too conservative an attitude has prevailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely action in the field," the task force declared.

The Commission and its task force were in agreement in recommending "watchdog" supervision of intelligence activities, but differed on its components.

The Commission proper recommended two groups: a "Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence," similar to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy; and a presidentially appointed "committee of experienced private citizens" which would report to both the President and the public and serve on a part-time basis.

The Clark task force recommended a single group similar to the Hoover Commission itself. It would be composed of Senators, Congressmen and private citizens on a permanent basis.

Although the Hoover report carried no dissents, Rep. Chet Holifield (D-Calif.), one of the 12 commissioners, commented from his office that he was opposed to the inclusion of private citizens in any intelligence "watchdog" group.

"I figure if there is going to be a 'watchdog' committee it should be composed of Congressmen and Senators because they are the people who have to do the legislating and appropriating and have control over functions and funds," Holifield declared.

The task force, which spent eight months investigating United States intelligence activities both here and abroad, referred all cases of "derogatory" security information to the FBI. It reported that so far none of the personnel named

dependent of congressional review. Until now, congressional liaison with CIA has been limited to small informal briefings between CIA Director Allen W. Dulles and key members of the Senate Armed Services and House Military Affairs Committees.

The task force found Dulles "industrious, objective, selfless, enthusiastic and imaginative." It added, however, "in his enthusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome duties and responsibilities on the operational side of CIA's activities.

The task force recommended Dulles employ a "chief of staff" to handle his day-to-day chores. He currently has a chief deputy director and three secondary deputy directors. Dulles, however, because of the necessary security compartmentalization in CIA, is believed to be the only man informed on all activities of his agency.

It also recommended:

- CIA be revamped internally "to produce greater emphasis on certain of its basic statutory functions."

- Dulles' salary be raised from \$18,000 to \$20,000 a year and that of his chief deputy, Air Force Lieut. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, from \$14,000 to \$17,500.

- CIA employees overseas be given medical and leave benefits equivalent to those now granted members of the State Department's foreign service.

- Responsibility for collating scientific intelligence be transferred from the State Department to CIA because currently "we are not fully exploiting the possibilities of valuable military and technological data potentially available in scien-

has proved to be a security risk, although some cases still are being investigated and one individual is on leave without pay pending disposition of the case.

It concluded: "We discovered no valid ground for the suspicion that CIA or any other element of the intelligence family was being effectively contaminated by any organized subversive or Communist clique . . . the American people can and should give their full confidence and support to the intelligence program."

The task force declared "one flaw" in the present security system for intelligence personnel was that there was no periodic check-up comparable to that made by the FBI. (CIA actually maintains a continuous review).

The task force urged a periodic check-up "to guard against the possibility that some employee who was completely dependable and honorable when starting work might have changed character, fallen from grace, or succumbed to alien blandishments, or some personal weakness such as strong drink or sexual perversion."

It recommended that this periodic review of employee records be made at intervals no greater than five years apart.

The task force also reported a "loophole" in security which permits security risks removed from sensitive industrial jobs to remain at the same plant and retain nonsensitive jobs.

The task force's investigation covered the Government's nine top intelligence agencies, CIA, National Security Council, National Security Agency, FBI, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission.

Much of the investigation was concentrated on CIA, as it is not only the largest of the Government's intelligence agencies, but also the one

potentially available in scientific reports.

CIA be allowed to consolidate in one \$50 million headquarters building office space now scattered in more than 30 structures here—and thus save the Government almost \$3 million annually. (The House has already authorized such a building and the bill is now before the Senate.)

Serving with Gen. Clark on the task force were: Adm. (ret.) Richard L. Conolly, president of Long Island University; Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina's Lieutenant Governor; Capt. "Eddie" Rickenbacker, Eastern Air Lines board chairman; Donald S. Russell, president of the University of South Carolina; and Harry Kearns, La Verne (Calif.) manufacturer.

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For the  Comments on JMIA in relation to   
folder, and interview of May 17, 1955.

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April 10, 1953

Interviews: Darling/ Wright, E. K. (former DDCI)

Subject: Vandenberg and Hillenkoetter Administration

1st Interview: Souers Progress Report; commercial contacts;  
psychological warfare; DCI and IAB; OSO; OSI; Eberstadt Committee;  
Hansen Baldwin.

2nd Interview: Black propaganda; "SSE"; right of inspection;

Dulles Committee men;  and OSO.

See folder "CIA"

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Dulles-Jackson-Correa Survey

Diary

STATINTL

October 22, 1952  
December 2, 1952

Interview: Hillenkoetter/Darling (2 meetings)

Subject: Hillenkoetter's term as DCI

Makes references to Hillenkoetter's intelligence career; military versus civilian director; opinion of OSS; his concept of CIA--at first, after the National Security Act; individual versus collective responsibility; national estimates; the IAC as viewed by W. Park Armstrong, Admiral Inglis, Secretary Royall, and Hillenkoetter; ICAPS; Scientific Intelligence; Reports and Estimates; OPC; Bogota incident; Dulles Survey; budget and Comptroller; National Security Council; Mc Narney Report; Eberstadt Report.

See folder "CIA: Hillenkoetter/Darling Interviews

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